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The Nature of the New 'Responsibility
Systems'
Collective agriculture in China has now run the whole
gamut of the possibilities of socialist farming,
producing a richer variety of experience than in any
other communist country. China has moved from the
mutual-aid teams and service co-operatives of 1951-53
to the abruptly enforced Soviet-kolkhoz style of
collective of 1956-57, to the communes of 1958-59, to
the 'three-level ownership' of 1960, to the looser sanzi
yibao1 experiments of 1962-65, to the reassertion of
commune-style collectivism in the Dazhai movement,
and over the past two years to the encouragement of
'production responsibility systems'.
The plural 'systems' indicates their variety, and the
flexibility with which they are meant to be applied, but
the central thrust is clear. It is the substitution of
contracts for the subordination of the commune
members to the leadership in day-to-day farming
operations. Groups, households or individuals enter
into output contracts with the team; it should be
stressed that these are not contracts to plough or hoe
so much land, or to perform other partial tasks; they
are for the final output. Most commonly, the farming
household, or a group of households, contracts for a
given output; any surplus over the contracted amount
is divided between the household and the collective in
proportions agreed in the contract. All production is
subject to unified distribution by the team or brigade
leadership, though in conformity with the contract.
Although the labour involved in meeting the
contractual obligation is often initially calculated in
work-points, the value of the work-point no longer
varies as formerly with the total production of the
collective; the calculation is simply the preliminary
means of arriving at an equitable contract, to ensure
for example that the family working full-time on
raising rabbits for export does not earn unconscionably
more for an hour's labour than the family growing
grain.
Two and a half years of experiment in China's
endlessly differing local conditions has produced a
perplexing variety of arrangements and combinations.
'Literally, 'three selves, one contract': more private plots, more free
markets, more enterprises on a profit or loss basis, and giving output
quotas on a household basis.
Bulletin, 1982, vol 13 no 4, Institute of Development Studies, Susses
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To clarify the picture, we should make some
distinctions.
First, there is a distinction between arable farming
and items of diversification, traditionally called
'sidelines'. The latter include care of animals and
poultry, vegetable-growing, forestry, fish-raising,
handicrafts. To encourage diversification and increase
local crafts and industries in order to reduce surplus
rural labour and maximise peasant incomes, a division
of labour is now seen to be necessary. Also, to increase
labour productivity a degree of specialisation is
needed. Hence there is a move away from the idea that
every labourer must devote his normal working day to
participation in the growth of grain. It is now
acceptable that some may spend their full time in some
other line of production. The contract system was
therefore applied first to activities other than arable
farming. Subsequently in some areas it was applied
also to grain growing; for once it is accepted that some
members of the collective can specialise in raising
poultry or taking care of the team's orchard, it is
difficult to resist the idea that grain also might be
advantageously grown by 'specialist' groups or
households in the same way.
Second, there is the obvious distinction as to the
unit rewarded for labour or output - the production
team (specialised within a brigade), the work group,
the household or the individual labourer.
Third, there is the basis of remuneration - fixed
remuneration for an assigned task; remuneration for
an assigned task with rewards and penalties for over or
under fulfilment; remuneration for contracted output;
profit sharing; and individual enterprise subject only
to taxes, levies and procurement.
Fourth, there is the task for the performance of
which remuneration is given: piecework, target,
quota, contract, or (virtually) the payment of 'rent'
and taxes.
Fifth - and perhaps the most critical for the future
of collective agriculture there are distinctions in the
way in which the product of team members is
distributed: unified accounting and distribution of the
whole product (except for that of private plots and
private sidelines); unified distribution of quota
production; unified distribution of communal levies
on and profits from contractors; and in the case of the
system of 'full responsibility to the household for task
completion', little or no communal distribution except
in the form of the social wage represented by welfare,
health and cultural services where such exist or
continue to exist.
Sixth, there is the division of teams into poor,
middling and successful. In the first stages of the
introduction of the responsibility systems, this
distinction was critical. It was argued that in successful
teams relatively little change in the organisation of
production and the remuneration of labour was
necessary, except to slough off the Dazhai inheritance.
However, in the poorest teams, where (ironically)
collectivisation had proved to be a source of burdens
rather than of benefits, a return to some form of family
farming was appropriate. Middling teams had the
choice of a range of intermediate possibilities, mostly
involving group, household or individual quotas or
contracts. This distinction has now worn rather thin.
In the successful teams, because prosperity and the
degree of diversification tend to be related, there is
actually maximum scope for specialised contracting,
in which arable farming soon becomes involved. And
at every level, the strong desire of the majority of
peasants or, to be more cautious, of at least a
minority strong enough to enforce the desired changes
- to maximise their independence as producers has
had an impact on the results. The various forms of
individual and household cultivation have clearly
grown far beyond the original 1979 idea that such an
unsocialist mode of production was permissible only
for a few remote and scattered farms, which had
probably never in practice operated as a part of the
collectives in any case.
Problems in Previous Agriculture Policies
It might seem, at least at first sight, as if collectivised
agriculture in China were well on the way to near-total
collapse. It would also seem that the new system (if it is
indeed a system) is at virtually all points in contrast to
the Maoist inheritance. To reach a conclusion on these
issues, it is necessary to discuss the reasons given by
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In many paris of China day-to-day farming operations have been returned to the family.
'I.
Deng Xiaoping and his supporters for undertaking
this sweeping, revolutionary (or perhaps counter-
revolutionary) transformation.
It is not unreasonable that the Party and Government
of China should be discontented with the progress so
far of Chinese agriculture. Although production has
increased at a commendable rate overall and has
somewhat more than kept pace with population
growth, the situation is still far from acceptable. The
scarcity of grain is still a tight constraint on both
development and the increase of welfare. Growth has
been erratic, and the present leaders of China point to
the fact that the worst periods from this point of view
have been those in which the left was in power and put
its egalitarian policies into operation [Yu Gaoyao
1980:28].2 During the period of leftist dominance,
official policies had hampered the growth of
agricultural output by giving absolute priority to grain
and neglecting - or even condemning - diversifi-
cation. The results of the vast campaigns which have
characterised the rural scene since 1949 are now
questioned. Finally, while conceding that agricultural
production continued to rise during the Cultural
Revolution decade, critics now point out that peasant
incomes failed to rise in proportion and in some areas
even decreased in spite of increased output. The
Communist Party's official newspaper, People's Daily,
calculated that among 100 mn peasants collectivisation
had failed to raise production significantly during a
period when population as a whole had doubled
[Renmin Ribao 1980a1. Average rural incomes
remained far below average urban incomes; the rural
80 per cent of the population received only 20 per cent
of national income. Indeed, it has been estimated that
in one in six of China's 2,000 or so counties the
peasants had 'lost faith in the collective', and whei'e
this was so, it was necessary to allow them to return,
for the present, to family farming [Renmin Ribao
1980b].
The present diagnosis of past failures can be
summarised as follows:
1) Investment had been pushed to unrealistically
high levels in an attempt to improve agriculture, but
with poor results. Zhan Wu, director of the
Agricultural Economics Institute of the Chinese
Academy of Social Science, has estimated that
irrigation works were less than 50 per cent effective;
moreover, that while from 1965 to 1977 capital
'Preference has been given in the quotation of sources to materials
available in translation, and especially to the monitoring reports of
Chinese broadcasts published by the BBC (Summary of World Broad-
casts, part III, The Far East) and the FBIS (China Daily Report).
These have the advantage of including coverage of provincial as well
as central material, particularly valuable for the subject of this essay.
These are referred to as S (BBC/SWB) and F (FBIS) respectively.
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invested in farm machinery had increased over eight-
fold and chemical fertiliser supplies had grown by
almost two and a half times, and while farm costs had
increased by 130 per cent, production had risen by
only 80 per cent. Zhan emphasised that 'increased
investment is not the only way to speed up
development' [Guangming Ribao 19801.
The level of management ability among many
rural cadres is very low.3 Some teams have no
accountants; some leaders have worked for 10 years
without even an account book. Others combine the
posts of team leader, accountant, work-point recorder
and store-keeper. Many teams do not know what they
have spent in materials, money and labour, and have
no means of judging the return on expenditure. There
is little or no democratic discussion of collective
accounts. The level of waste is described as 'appalling',
and there is every opportunity for privilege and
peculation because cadres need not make any
distinction between their public business and their
private interests. Rural cadres also have little
knowledge of modern scientific methods. They are
former peasants, mostly recruited during land reform
and collectivisation, they are ageing rapidly, and there
is little prospect of their replacement by younger men
with greater knowledge and new ideas because too few
of the inadequate number of graduates in agriculture
are willing to serve in the villages. Grass-roots cadres
are largely incapable of taking decisions for
themselves, and the institutional framework - in
which commune-level cadres are salaried servants of
the state - actually discourages initiative; the safest
course is to obey orders.
The burdens imposed on the peasants are heavy,
unpredictable and counter-productive.4 In some cases
the total handed over to the team, brigade, commune
and state in taxes, levies, accumulation etc is over 50
per cent of gross production, and in this respect the
poorer teams - less able to support this wasteful
superstructure - suffer most. The first burden is the
uncontrolled investment already alluded to. The
second is the swollen administration, the number of
cadres suported by 'subsidies' and enjoying from this
source incomes often two or three times as high as
those of the peasants. The third burden arises from the
abuse of the state monopoly of trade; procurement
norms are raised in good years or prices reduced
[Renmin Ribao l981a] so that 'the more enthusiastic
'On the faults ascribed to grass-roots cadres, see especially
S/6568/81115, Reninin Ribao, 3/11/80; F/2531L42, Renmin Ribao
13/12/80; F/238/T2, Hong Kong Ming Fao, 6/12/81, reporting Xin
Guancha.
40n peasant burdens, see especially: F/225/20/11/79. Renmin Ribao
6/iI/79. S/6479/BI1/1. Guizhou 20/7/80; F1145/T. Renmin Ribao
11/7/81; S/6814/BIl/l. NCNA (Chinese) 25/8/81. 5/6826/C.3.
NCNA (Chinese) 4/9/81; S/6843/BI1.2. Renmin Ribao 17.9.81.
you have been, the greater your burden'. Supply and
marketing co-operatives play the same game of
forcing prices down in times of plenty, while the
peasants are not allowed to seek an alternative buyer.
Not only the team leadership but the higher levels also
put in their claims on the incomes of production
teams. It is in fact normal for over 30 per cent of gross
production to be siphoned off before any distribution
of the product is made to the peasants; this is about the
same proportion of total farm incomes as was taken by
the landlords from their tenants before the revolution.
The authorities re-allocated peasant resources 'in
violation of exchange at equal value', [Renmin Ribao
1980c] with no respect for the rights of ownership of
individuals or of teams.
The problem of distribution, 'to each according
to his labour', has never been solved. The piecework
and job contract system which was used in imitation of
traditional Soviet methods was not satisfactory;
quality of work could not be controlled. The free
supply system of the Great Leap Forward, however,
was far worse: the labourer received much the same
income whether he worked hard or not. The Dazhai
system of self-assessment was similar and people came
to think that they would get the same regardless of
how they worked. Though methods of work
assessment were tried in some places, they proved
inadequate in measuring accurately the quality of the
performance of a farm task involving so many people,
because for most of the year farm tasks cannot be
expressed in terms of output. It has frequently been
pointed out that productivity on the private plot,
where incentives are not impaired, is much higher than
on the collective fields, and represents the intensive
and meticulous cultivation which China must achieve
on all her farmland.
The suppression of private plots, rural fairs and
family sideline occupations severely limited peasant
incomes. The obsession with growing grain prevented
the team or the brigade from pursuing similar sources
of profit collectively. These restrictions, by reducing
incomes, also reduced the possibilities of accumulation,
which in turn limited the improvement of arable
farming; this was reflected in the failure of incomes to
rise substantially and the result was to depress
incentives still further: 'who wants to do unprofitable
work?' said the peasants. Many deserted the collective
farm for itinerant peddling or craft work.
Rationale for the Introduction of
'Responsibility Systems'
The responsibility systems are believed to be the cure
for these ills. They should be seen in the context of
more general changes in agricultural policy. These
include the recent increases in procurement prices and
decreases in the price of farm inputs; the enlargement
of private plots and the provision in addition,
according to circumstances, of fodder plots, grain
ration plots and hill plots for the growing of timber,
fuel, fruit and tea; the partial freeing of rural markets;
the encouragement (instead of repression) of individual
and family sideline production; measures to increase
investment in light industry in order to increase the
flow of incentive goods; increased investment in
agriculture, especially investment by local authorities;
diversification of agricultural and rural production;
and - last but not least - the democratisation of
collective management.
Behind this range of policies lie certain assumptions
about the strategy of rural growth: that increased
peasant purchasing power is a major - if not the
major - driving force of national economic
development; that therefore priority in state invest-
ment should be given to agriculture; that all the
potentialities of each local community must be
exploited in order to increase income and so increase
the possibility of local investment; that in this last
process, local collective industrialisation has a key role
to play as the major means of raising capital for the
transformation of agriculture; and that local poten-
tialities can be fully developed only if the process is a
democratic one, in which the grass-root communities
and their individual members are given the maximum
freedom of decision-making compatible with general
- and largely indicative - socialist planning.
These assumptions are all derived from the thought of
Mao Zedong. The strategy has not changed; what has
changed is organisation, as a result of the conviction
that previous policies and institutions unnecessarily
minimised incentives. The agonies of the cultural-
revolution struggle led to re-thinking about the nature
of socialist organisation, in the course of which some
hitherto sacrosanct assumptions were rejected. The
new leaders deny that there is something intrinsically
socialist in collectivising everything and on the largest
possible scale. Scale alone does not create economies if
there is no division of labour and no specialisation and
co-operation in any meaningful sense. Such a system
incurs the inevitable wastes of large-scale production
while offering none of its advantages. As the Chinese
put it, to allow production relations to outrun the
development of productive forces is positively
counter-productive.
Second, they affirm that it is the content of
collectivisation which matters. To allow collectivi-
sation outrun the development of management ability,
accounting skills, technology, the willingness of
prosperous communities to share with adjacent
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poorer communities, and political consciousness
generally is also counter-productive. Mao's speedy
collectivisation in 1955 and 1956 is now condemned as
a 'strategic failure'; the 1958 destruction of the
marginal economic independence left to the peasants
in the form of private plots and rural fairs is
denounced as an excess; the merging of rich and poor
teams in single units of account and distribution is
rejected; and the ideological identification of
collectivism with one particular form of labour
organisation - large-scale direct management by the
collective leadership - is repudiated.
The responsibility systems aim, among other things, to
substitute temporarily for this ideal and final type of
socialist mass production a pattern of specialisation
based on existing, largely manual, technology through
the system of contracts. It is argued that this is not a
retreat but an advance, because division of labour will
stimulate technological change. The case of 'full
responsibility to households', however, is frankly
admitted to be a case of reculer pour mieux sauter, not
'a communist aspiration'.
The new contract systems are seen as representing a
single, key change which can solve many problems of
collectivisation. The specialisation and division of
labour provide a form of organisation which can deal
with the urgent need for diversification. It improves
incentives in collective production. Where successful,
it makes private plots unnecessary, thus eliminating a
major conflict of interest. It minimises managerial
overheads and the effects of managerial incompetence.
It is simple and comprehensible. It cuts down the need
for collective accounting and reduces the possibility of
waste and peculation by ensuring that most of the
accounting is done in terms of the negotiation of
contracts, during which peasants as individuals and as
a team can defend their financial rights and interests.
Finally, it is democratic.
This last point - the political implications of
responsibility systems - is given equal stress with the
economic implications. A suitable responsibility
system 'can encourage members to increase their
independence and their initiative, and free cadres from
their unnecessary task of "disciplining" people'
[Renmin Ribao 1981b]. An attempt is being made to
create an effective framework to protect the rights and
interests of teams against higher authorities, and of
members against the team. For instance, Shanghai
suburban communes have begun the election of
management committees, to give members 'the
minimum necessary guarantee for exercising their
democratic rights'. Elsewhere, provisions have been
made to ensure democratic discussion of and control
over collective financial policies.
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In the choice and implementation of responsibility
systems, it has been repeatedly stressed that the
decision lies with the team members; they should be
guided but not coerced. Cases have been widely
publicised where the team party committee has been
severely reprimanded by higher party authority for
attempting to force a particular system on its
members. This insistence on democratic decision has
been taken to the point of accepting that even a
majority decision of the team's members should not
necessarily be imposed on a dissenting minority; teams
may use different responsibility systems at the same
time, so that members can enter into any reasonable
relationship with the collective.
The most interesting feature of the whole movement is
the admission that the operation of rural economic life
by a party hierarchy, whose members owed no
responsibility to anyone except their hierarchical
seniors, has been not only politically dangerous but
economically counter-productive. In agriculture as in
industry, China now seeks to replace central party
direction by a combination of controls - indicative
planning, market discipline and democratic control
from below.
Even the commune system itself has been under fire as
economically irrational and undemocratic. According
to an article in the journal Economic Management,
communes have encouraged over-accumulation, and
over-hasty transition to larger collectives flouted the
rights of the basic-level production teams, drained
their resources and restricted their economic and
political initiative. The commune system has also been
criticised for fusing, and thereby confusing, economic
management and governmental administration. The
result is a proposed reform which abolishes the system
of three-level ownership and vests full ownership
rights in the teams, and which redefines the commune
as an economic corporation, assigning its previous
governmental functions to a revived local government
unit (xiang). Such an experiment was under way by
late 1981 in Fengyang county, Anhui Province.
The communes, therefore, may very soon be
abolished; the most famous institution of Chinese
socialism may disappear. If so, there would be losses
as well as gains, and perhaps a more considered
diagnosis of their failings would recognise that the
fault lay not in the commune system itself but in the
undemocratic domination of the three levels by the
state party hierarchy; and the consequent change of
the three levels of communal ownership (a concept
quite compatible with democratic control) into three
ftirther levels of the centralised hierarchy.
Impact and Implications of the New Policy
Local reports of the operation of the responsibility
systems show striking increases of production and
incomes. Caution is needed, however. We had no lack
of striking examples of success from the communes of
1958 and from the Dazhai model and its imitators in
the 1970s, examples which were probably true but not
necessarily typical. Widespread resistance to the new
system obliges its supporters to redouble their
propaganda. Moreover, it should never be forgotten
that in China's climatic conditions it is difficult to
judge the effects of any agricultural policy over less
than a period often years; and so far none of China's
successive policies has ever been allowed to run
unchanged for so long. More convincing, perhaps,
than selective accounts of dramatic success is the
report of a crash programme in Anhui Province to
build extra grain-storage capacity, after two years of
the responsibility systems. Significant too is the
unprecedented boom in rural house-building. Such
information gives some credence to the reports from
11 provinces of striking increases in almost all
branches of agriculture, in rural incomes and in the
amount of grain marketed. National production
figures also suggest that agriculture has progressed at
a sharply increased pace, although the information is
not such as to make it possible to give any one part of
the complex of new policies the greatest credit.
The local examples of success express the expectation
that not only will grain production increase rapidly,
but also, and even more rapidly, the production of
'diversification items'; not only production, but
incomes; and not only the incomes of those already
prosperous, but the incomes of the poorest, and
perhaps these will increase faster. Examples are
already being given of the increased ability to face
famine of those teams which have most successfully
diversified production via the responsibility system.
Nevertheless, there has been, and continues to be,
much resistance to the new policies. The picture one
gets is of reluctant middle and lower rural cadres being
squeezed between the upper millstone of a leadership
determined on change, and the lower millstone of
peasant communities only too ready to accept it. In
May 1980, People's Daily complained that 'many local
authorities are stubbornly hanging on to their power
to plan sowing and planting and to handle and process
products. They fear being unable to "exercise control"
[Renmin Ribao 1980d]. The resistance at lower levels
was partly the expression of vested interests. Some
cadres, it was said, understood and agreed with the
policies, but resisted implementing them because
'there was nothing in it for them'. One cadre, talking to
the Party Secretary of his Prefecture, frankly said: 'If
you assign households full responsibility for task
completion . . . what am I going to eat?'
People's Daily itself admitted that the new system had
its dangers to socialism and listed ten [NCNA 1980].
They were:
purchase, use, maintenance, repair and manage-
ment of large machines and tools;
- unified and rational use of water resources;
- care of draft animals;
- prevention of pests and diseases;
- popularisation of scientific farming;
- defence against natural disasters;
- farmland capital construction;
commune and brigade enterprise and diversi-
fication;
- water and soil conservation;
- care of the needy.
The author of the article might well have added danger
to the implementation of family planning, to the
maintenance of rural employment, and most signifi-
cant of all, to the very existence of collectivised
farming.
With the proponents of change in full control of the
media, one can scarcely expect a great deal of evidence
to be published at this point supporting the fears
expressed in People's Daily. Inevitably, the tendency
has been to give examples showing that such fears are
illusory, that these problems are not inherent in the
responsibility system and can be solved by good
administration. It is too early to evaluate this
optimism and the evidence so far is ambiguous. On
irrigation, for example, it has been suggested that the
application of the responsibility system will actually
improve the effective use of water. The change in the
organisation of farming will in any case scarcely affect
large and medium catchment areas, but only small
village networks. The effect on the care of draft
animals cannot yet be estimated. Depending on the
form of responsibility in operation, they may be
allocated under unified management, hired out to the
contracting peasants, allotted on long loan to
contractors, or in some cases sold to households
operating the full responsibility system. Contracts are
expected to guarantee the care and protection of
animals, and if the contracts are sensibly drawn up
care of animals might well improve.
A return to farming operated by individual families
could jeopardise pest and disease control, but
examples are given of household farming contractors
forming organisations of neighbours to carry out
spraying.
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Innovation is being encouraged by contracts between
teams, groups or households and the extension
stations, by which the extension station will take the
risks and share the profits. It is hoped that this will
represent a vast improvement on the present situation
in which 'the peasants doze while the leaders shout
themselves hoarse propagandising new techniques'.
Another fear expressed by the People's Daily was that
defence against natural disasters would suffer. This is
to assume that such defence depends solely on the
ability to mobilise the necessary labour, which may
indeed be impaired by the greater independence of
both teams and members. But defence depends in the
long run as much on the increase of production and so
of reserves, on diversification so that peasants do not
have all their eggs in one basket, and on the capacity to
accumulate funds for irrigation and flood control
which depends again on increased production and
incomes, all of which (the supporters of change would
argue) can best be delivered by the responsibility
systems.
The threat to the maintenance of social security
services is serious enough for the state council to have
issued a circular on the subject. There is plenty of
evidence from areas where full responsibility to
households is widespread that there is some difficulty
in inducing the peasants to meet their social
obligations, such as contributions to the payment of
teachers and barefoot doctors. Those who favour the
responsibility system argue that as production and
incomes increase so will the ability of teams to
accumulate, and those in distress can then be better
provided for.
In the end, the overcoming of such problems depends
on the successful maintenance of the necessary degree
of 'collective' control, which could be exercised by the
team or by a reconstituted local political authority, or
by a division of responsibilities between the two. The
problem here is primarily with the systems which give
contracts for arable farming to households, or give
them full responsibility. Here, there is a manifest
danger, amply illustrated in the records, that the
peasants will use their autonomy to resist their
remaining responsibilities. It is clear that the
leadership regards the responsibility systems not as a
surrender to individualism, but as a re-articulation of
collective responsibilities. Ownership remains with the
production team; land allotted to contractors is to be
used only for the purposes specified in the contract
and it cannot be bought, sold, pledged or rented out or
in, nor can it be built upon or used as a source of clay,
sand or minerals. Normally, means of production such
as tools allotted for use are hired to the contractors or
if allotted free are subject to the payment of a
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depreciation charge. It is emphasised that land must
be distributed according to labour power, with or
without some modification to take account of
dependents, and it should on no account be allotted
according to the individual holdings of the post-land-
reform period.
Planning is expected to remain firmly in the hands of
the collective. The team is free to choose what it sows,
plants or manufactures, vis-à-vis higher authorities,
though subject to the state's 'reference plans'. The
team members do not have such freedom. The team
plans production and allocates responsibilities within
this plan to groups, households and individuals.
The collective is expected to continue the process of
accumulation of collective capital, although in the
poorer areas it is accepted that little or no
accumulation can be expected in the near future until
the economic wounds of the past have healed. With
this exception - a large exception it must be said - it
is laid down, though as an expectation rather than a
rule, that abour 20 per cent of net income [Renmin
Ribao 1980e; ShanxiRibao nd] will be accumulated for
all purposes: next year's production expenses,
overhead costs, welfare funds and funds for 'expanded
reproduction'. In all cases except that of the
assignment of full responsibility to households, all
contracted or quota products, the products of
remaining collective operations (such as handicraft
workshops) and products from joint team-member
shared-profit ventures are handed over to the
collective for unitary distribution. In most cases of
quota agreements (as opposed to contracts) the whole
product is handed over.
Provincial and local stipulations on these questions
vary a good deal, but this is the essential position of the
collective in the contract system. The collective
remains owner, planner, accumulator and distributor,
and although collectivism has been relaxed it has by no
means been destroyed.
The perspective of future change also remains firmly
socialist. The contract system, including contracting
to households, is regarded as a new and better
beginning for the gradual building up as technology
changes of a true system of socialist division of labour
and specialisation.
The assignment of full responsibility to households is
clearly a different matter, and difficulties are already
appearing. Offered the opportunity of restored
independence, peasants in many parts of China have
responded by returning collective property to
individual ownership - even sometimes destroying
what cannot be distributed. Some are stubbornly
planting what they choose to plant, or refusing to
plant at all and taking up non-agricultural occupations.
They are refusing to contribute to the upkeep of
cadres, teachers and paramedics. Often rural cadres,
caught between insistence from above that the
peasants must be allowed to choose the responsibility
system they want, and the determination of many
peasant communities to choose whatever gives them
the most independence, resign their posts or cease to
lead, leaving the way free for the re-assertion of
individual farming. The national leadership has
moved - or has been pushed - from the concession
of restored family farming only to remote and
scattered households to consenting to its extension to
the poorest villages, to acceptance that this would in
fact involve 100 mn farming households, to admission
that full responsibility 'is the system preferred by the
masses', to a point at which collectivised agriculture,
in any sense recognised in the past, may well come to
apply only to a minority of China's peasants.
It may be that the new leadership is providing a further
illustration of that old political saw, that the most
dangerous time for an authoritarian regime is when it
starts to reform; it may have aroused, in its attempts to
replace collective management by contract, expect-
ations which it cannot control.
On the other hand, there may be more deliberation in
the process than is admitted. In October 1980, Red
Flag referred with admiration to the Danish
agricultural system [Yu Gaoyao 1980]. This was in a
context which showed plainly that an analogy was
perceived between the Danish system and the new
responsibility system; and it was followed by the
assertion that the latter could be the foundation of a
Chinese style of socialist agriculture. The Danish
system, of course, is one of independent agricultural
producers operating within a framework of co-
operative supply, processing, marketing, credit and
research and development, and linked to these co-
operatives by contract.
Is this what Deng Xiaoping has in mind?
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